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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, the world has witnessed a series of
transitions to democracy: in Southern Europe in the 1970s, in
South America in the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe in the
1990s. 1 In each of these transitions, governments have had to
f L.L.M., Columbia University, 2000; Bachelor of Laws, University of Ot-
tawa, Canada, 1994. Mr. Freeman has recently begun work with the newly formed
International Center for Transitional Justice. He previously worked with the U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and as a lawyer in private
practice.
1 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991). Huntington refers to this series of transitions
as the "third wave" of democracy. He argues that the first wave of democratization
began in the 1820s and continued until 1926, during which period approximately
29 democracies came into existence. A "reverse wave" reduced the number of de-
mocracies in the world to 12 by 1942. The second wave was said to last from 1945
1
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grapple with a complex set of moral, legal and political issues.
These include how to deal with past violations of human rights,
how to foster long term economic and social development, and
how to restructure political institutions to safeguard democracy
for the future. This article focuses only on the last of these is-
sues. In particular, this article attempts to assess which of the
three most common forms of democratic political governance -
parliamentarianism, presidentialism or semi-presidentialism
- best facilitates successful democratic transition. 2
This article is divided into three main sections. The first
section will set out the thesis being tested, together with the
assumptions and limitations that underlie it. The second sec-
tion will review the prototypical characteristics of presidential-
ism, parliamentarianism, and semi-presidentialism, including
the relationship in each case between the executive and legisla-
tive branches, and between each branch and the citizenry. The
third section of the article will analyze the experiences of the
first country in Southern Europe, in South America and in
Eastern Europe to have completed a democratic transition
under the dominant constitutional model of its region. Accord-
ingly, the section will focus on Spain's experience with parlia-
mentary government, Argentina's experience with presidential
government, and Poland's experience with semi-presidential
government. 3 In each case, there will be (i) a review of the his-
tory of the transition in that particular country, (ii) an analysis
of the dynamics of the executive-legislative relationship during
the critical years of the transition, and (iii) an examination of
various hypothetical counter-factual scenarios, with a view to
considering how things might have turned out under a different
system of government. Following these three sections, a tenta-
to 1962 during which time 36 countries democratized. This was followed by a sec-
ond reverse wave lasting from 1960 to 1975, during which the number of democra-
cies was reduced to 30. As for the third wave, according to his calculations,
approximately 30 countries made transitions to democracy between 1974 and
1992. See generally id.
2 See THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (Juan Linz & Arturo
Valenzuela eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE FAILURE); see also JUAN J. LINz & ALFRED
STEPHAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION (1996) [here-
inafter DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION].
3 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 87, 191-92, 255. See also id.
at 167-71 as to why Brazil, which started its transition before Argentina, did not
complete it until many years later.
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tive conclusion will be provided regarding the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each model for countries in democratic
transition. 4
I. THEsis, ASSUMPTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
A. Thesis
Spain, Argentina and Poland have all completed democratic
transitions.5 In each country, the transition involved a shift
from authoritarianism to democracy and was accompanied by a
determination to entrench democracy and democratic institu-
tions. 6 Spain, however, is arguably the only one of these coun-
tries where democracy has been consolidated.7 Does Spain's
4 It should be noted that there are a number of other models of democratic
government which do not fit neatly into any of the presidential, parliamentary or
semi-presidential types. Examples of these are the German model (often referred
to as "chancellor's democracy"), the Swiss model (sometimes referred to as "consen-
sus democracy"), and more unusual models such as those of Fiji (parliamentary
government combined with a native chieftain) and Samoa (parliamentary govern-
ment combined with family heads). However, because these models have not been
adopted by any of the new democracies, they properly fall outside of the scope of
this article. For a brief discussion of some of these forms, see generally Juan J.
Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy - Does it make a Difference, in THE
FAILURE, supra note 2, at 42-44 [hereinafter Presidential or Parliamentary
Democracy].
5 A "democratic transition" can be considered complete when the following
conditions are in place: (a) a broad agreement about political procedures which is
sufficient to produce an elected government; (b) a government which has come to
power as a direct result of a free and popular vote; (c) an elected government which
de facto has the authority to generate new policies; and (d) executive, legislative
and judicial branches of government which have de jure independence from other
state institutions. See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS, supra note 2, at 3.
6 See generally Jose MARIA MARAVALL, THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
SPAIN (1982) (regarding Spain); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996), at
53-104 (regarding Argentina); and MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM IN POLAND (1998) (regarding Poland).
7 A democratic regime can be considered "consolidated" when: (a) no signifi-
cant actors in society are either spending significant resources attempting to cre-
ate a non-democratic regime, or turning to violence or foreign intervention to
secede from the state; (b) a strong majority of public opinion believes that democ-
racy is the most appropriate form of political governance, with only a small and
isolated minority believing otherwise; and (c) governmental and non-governmental
forces are required and acculturated to resolving conflict within the rules of the
country's democratic process. See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 6.
Linz and Stepan also identify at least five other attributes of a consolidated democ-
racy: (a) a conducive environment for the development of a free and dynamic civil
society; (b) a relatively autonomous and valued political society; (c) a deep respect
for the rule of law; (d) a usable state bureaucracy; and (e) an institutionalized eco-
3
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choice of parliamentarianism help to explain the fact that it has
a consolidated democracy while Argentina and Poland do not?"
This article asserts that (i) the choice of parliamentarianism
provides a partial explanation for the fact that democracy has
been consolidated in Spain, and (ii) the choices of presidential-
ism in Argentina and semi-presidentialism in Poland provide a
partial explanation of the fact that democracy has not been con-
solidated in those countries.
This thesis rests on several inter-related assertions. First,
the overriding priority for any country in a democratic transi-
tion ought to be the generation of strong public support for de-
mocracy and its institutions as a guarantor against a return to
tyranny and its accompanying evils. Unfortunately, the public
optimism and the zeal for democracy one usually finds in the
earliest stages of a transition have a tendency to fade quickly if
conflict within a government prevents that government from ef-
fecting the reforms which are needed to meet public expecta-
tions.9  Conflict within government can also create an
opportunity for anti-democratic forces from the past to re-assert
themselves. 10 Consequently, it is important that the political
system chosen by a new democracy be conducive to a cooperative
form of political governance. It is, however, a reality of political
life that even governments able to function in a cooperative
manner can fall out of favor in the eyes of the public." The
danger of such circumstances in the context of a democratic
transition is that the public may consciously or unconsciously
translate its distaste for a particular government into distaste
for democracy (i.e., it may conclude that democracy is no better
nomic society (i.e., a market economy modified by responsible government regula-
tion and intervention). See id. at 7-13.
s See id. at 108-15, 200-04, 269-92. Although the analysis of Linz and Stepan
dates back to 1996, the chief problems of democratic consolidation that they iden-
tify regarding Argentina and Poland regrettably persist. See, e.g., J. PATRICIA
MCSHERRY, INCOMPLETE TRANSITION: MILITARY POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN ARGEN-
TINA (1997); HARALD WYDRA, CONTINuITIEs IN POLAND's PERMANENT TRANSITION
(2000).
9 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 258-70.
10 See id. at 231-253; see also Philippe C. Schmitter, Dangers and Dilemmas of
Democracy, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 72-92 (Larry Diamond &
Marc F. Plattner eds., 1996)[hereinafter THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE].
11 See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsid-
ered, in RE-EXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992).
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than the "old system," rather than concluding that there simply
needs to be a new government within a democratic frame-
work).12 It is, therefore, not only essential in the context of a
democratic transition that a political system promote coopera-
tion in governance, but it is also essential that the system pos-
sess the capacity to effect fluid changes in government or
leadership when public support undergoes a significant decline.
Second, as among parliamentary, presidential and semi-
presidential forms of government, this article asserts that par-
liamentary government furnishes institutional rules and ar-
rangements that are more conducive to cooperative and flexible
governance, and thus is better suited to successful democratic
transition. Parliamentarianism tends to be more conducive to
cooperative governance because of its fusion of the executive and
legislative branches into one body (i.e., parliament) and because
of the corresponding absence of a significant, separate political
prize outside of parliament (i.e., a powerful presidency). 13 As a
result of these attributes of the parliamentary system, coalition
building flows naturally because it is the only way to attain sig-
nificant power within the system in the absence of a legislative
majority. Parliamentarianism also tends to be more conducive
to flexible governance because of the relative efficiency of the
parliamentary vote of no confidence as a tool for replacing lead-
ers or governments that have fallen dramatically out of favor
with the public.' 4
In contrast, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism pro-
vide institutional rules and arrangements that are less condu-
cive to cooperative and flexible governance, primarily due to the
fact that they both provide for a president with robust de jure
and de facto powers that is directly elected for a fixed term.15
First, by establishing a separation of powers in which the presi-
dent and the legislature are to act as checks on each other, the
already conflictual politics endemic to fledgling democracies run
a high risk of transforming into destabilizing and debilitating
battles which can undermine public confidence in government
12 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 253-58.
13 See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, DEMocRAcIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TwENTY-oNE COUNRIEs 67-85 (1984).
14 See, e.g., Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 4, at 9-
15 See id. at 6-10.
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and public support for democracy. 16 Second, this risk is further
exacerbated by the fact that the president in these systems has
an independent mandate to govern for a fixed term (typically
four years or more), and, as a result, has no institutional incen-
tive to cede or share power. This is true even when he or she
becomes extremely unpopular or proves incapable of providing
effective government. 17 Although impeachment offers an escape
valve in times of crisis, it is a measure that is far more extreme
and more difficult to use than a simple vote of no confidence.18
These are of course very bold and very general claims being
advanced, and not altogether original.' 9 I believe, however,
that these claims involve critical questions that, if valid, hold
immense implications for policy makers and law reform advo-
cates in the context of democratic transitions.
B. Assumptions and Limitations
It is important to acknowledge that there are at least four
other fundamental institutional choices which are deeply inter-
connected with the choice of political model and which have a
16 Of course, those who favor a separation of powers argue that the separation
is necessary in order to avoid the "tyranny of majority" danger that they associate
with the absence of a formal separation of powers in a parliamentary system.
However, the "tyranny of majority" danger exists equally under all three systems
because just as the danger of tyranny exists in a parliamentary system in the
event that one party takes the majority of seats, it also exists in a presidential or
semi-presidential system in the event that one party takes both the presidency and
the legislature.
17 See Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 4, at 8-9. On this
point, supporters of presidential and semi-presidential systems argue that the
fixed term is an important way to provide executive stability, something they al-
lege to be lacking in parliamentary systems. This argument is, however, some-
what of a red herring because executive stability can readily be achieved under a
parliamentary system (assuming it is considered important and desirable) by sim-
ply instituting a more majoritarian-style electoral model, thereby circumventing
the oft-cited example of multi-party parliamentary dysfunction, viz., Italy. See,
e.g., GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING 53-83 (1994).
18 See Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, in Ti GLOBAL RESUR-
GENCE, supra note 10, at 137-138 [hereinafter Presidentialism]. Although votes of
no confidence are not easily achieved in a parliament led by a party with a major-
ity of seats, such majorities are relatively rare in the context of democratic transi-
tions which, because they are almost always marked by deep social divisions,
usually produce multi-party legislatures.
19 Indeed, many of these ideas were being debated over one hundred years ago
by people like Woodrow Wilson and Walter Bagehot. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON,
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1885).
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direct effect on democratic outcomes. First, architects of new
democratic constitutions must select an electoral system.20 The
two most common electoral models are: the plurality (i.e.,
majoritarian) model and the proportional representation
model.21 Second, a structure for the legislature, whether uni-
cameral, bicameral or hybrid, must be chosen.22 Third, a divi-
sion of powers system, whether federal or unitary, must be
selected. Fourth, a mechanism for judicial review must be se-
lected, whether centralized (following the Austrian model), de-
centralized (following the U.S. model) or hybrid.23
Although each of these additional institutional design
choices will have an impact on the choice of political system, the
impact each will have is indirect and secondary only. In other
words, the cooperation and flexibility deficiencies that I have
associated with presidential and semi-presidential systems flow
primarily and directly from the system features mentioned ear-
lier, viz., the fact that these systems provide for a powerful, di-
rectly elected president who governs for a fixed term. Other
institutional choices - such as the choice of a majoritarian elec-
toral system, a bicameral legislature, a unitary political struc-
ture, or a decentralized system of judicial review - can only
mitigate the negative effects associated with presidential and
semi-presidential government. 24 This is an important point be-
cause it underlines the value of examining the choice of political
system in isolation, to understand the distinctive role that it
plays in democratic consolidation.
20 See LIJPHART, supra note 13, at 150-168.
21 Other institutional choices related to electoral design include, inter alia,
the choice between (i) staggered and synchronized elections, (ii) single and double
ballot systems, and (iii) shorter and longer electoral terms. See generally SARTORI,
supra note 17.
22 See LIJPHART, supra note 13, at 90-105.
23 See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDIcIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE
LAW (1989).
24 Of course, the same point applies to other institutional choices as well. For
example, electoral systems based on proportional representation tend to produce
more political parties than systems based on majority vote. See SARTORI, supra
note 17, at 53. This can have a direct effect on minority representation and legisla-
tive efficiency. The choice of a parliamentary form of government, a unicameral
legislature, a unitary political structure or a centralized system of judicial review
can only mitigate the effects that are directly produced by the proportional repre-
sentation system.
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At this juncture it is important to also say a word about the
capacity of transitional democratic governments to freely choose
their new constitutional arrangements. Surprisingly, there is
relatively little that has been written about the process of con-
stitution-making in new democracies. 25 However, the signifi-
cance of this issue should be obvious. New democracies often
operate under a special set of constraints that complicate con-
stitutional reform. 26 For example, it is common in democratic
transitions for the outgoing undemocratic regime to extract con-
stitutional concessions as the price of relinquishing sovereign
powers. 27 It is also common for newly democratic governments
to find themselves saddled with existing constitutional
frameworks that impede reform. 28 Consequently, even if the
assertions in this article are valid, it is important to acknowl-
edge that constitution-making environments in new democra-
cies often place significant limitations on the capacity of
constitutional architects to enact the reforms that they consider
most appropriate.
Finally, it is important to briefly comment on the choice of
Spain, Poland and Argentina as case studies. First, as stated in
the introduction, each of these countries was the first in its re-
gion to have completed a democratic transition under the domi-
nant constitutional model of that region. 29 Second, the
experiences of these three countries provide a very representa-
tive indication of what in fact occurred in similarly situated
25 This point has also been noted by Jon Elster. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Constitu-
tion-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71 PUB. AD-
MIN. 169, 174-186 (1993).
26 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS, supra note 2, at 81-83.
27 One of the most notorious illustrations of this point comes from the demo-
cratic transition in Chile, where the price of re-establishing democracy included
the retention of a constitution created by the unelected Pinochet regime. The con-
stitution contained several de jure limitations on the new democratic government.
See generally Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Con-
straints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Viola-
tions, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1425 (1992).
28 Examples of this include the former United Soviet Socialist Republic and
Czechoslovakia, where at different moments in each transition, the non-demo-
cratic constitutions took on lives of their own and virtually paralyzed decision-
making processes. See generally Rett Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions -Prod-
uct of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 BOSTON U. INT'L L.
J. 1 (1998).
29 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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countries in their respective regions. Third, the transitions that
occurred in each of these countries share a number of important
similarities: (i) each involved a non-violent transition from au-
thoritarianism to democracy; (ii) in each case the transitional
government had to deal with a weakened but nevertheless pow-
erful military institution; (iii) in each case public support for
democracy was very high at the beginning of the transition; (iv)
the results of the initial legislative elections in each country
failed to produce strong majorities; and (v) each country is a
dominant player in its geopolitical context.30 Although there
are, of course, many social, economic and political differences
between these countries, the similarities identified above make
them appropriate case studies for the purposes of this compara-
tive inquiry.
II. DEFINITIONS
This section will provide an outline of the principal defini-
tional features of the "pure" forms of presidential, parliamen-
tary and semi-presidential government, including a breakdown
of the relationship in each case between the executive and legis-
lative branches, and between each branch and the citizenry.31
These elements are the minimal criteria that must be present
in a system for it to be properly and fairly characterized as par-
liamentary, presidential or semi-presidential. Thus, although
the South American version of presidentialism is not identical
to the United States version, each of them shares the minimal
definitional features of presidentialism as defined below.32
Similarly, although the parliamentary model used in Southern
Europe is not identical to that in the United Kingdom, and al-
30 See, e.g., id. at 87-115, 190-204, 255-292.
31 In developing these definitions, I have endeavored to include only those
characteristics that all political scientists seem to accept as being the constitutive
elements of each model. See generally, LIJPHART, supra note 13; Alfred Stepan &
Cindy Skach, Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism in Comparative Perspec-
tive, in THE FAILURE, supra note 2, at 119-136; see also generally DESIGNS FOR DEM-
OCRATIC STABILITY (Abdo Baaklini & Helen Desfosses eds., 1997) [hereinafter
DESIGNS]; Ezra N. Suleiman, Presidentialism and Political Stability in France, in
THE FAILURE, supra note 2, at 137-162.
32 See generally Carlos Nino, The Debate on Constitutional Reform in Latin
America, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 635 (1992-19933) [hereinafter Debate Over Con-
stitutional Reforms]; Fred W. Riggs, The Survival of Presidentialism in America:
Para-constitutional Practices, 9 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 247, 248-250 (1988).
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though the semi-presidential model used in much of eastern Eu-
rope is not identical to that in France, in each case there is
conformity with the minimal or "pure" elements of the political
model as defined below.33
A. The "Pure" Parliamentary Model
"Pure" parliamentary government, unlike presidential gov-
ernment, does not permit a strict separation of powers between
the legislative and executive branches.34 Instead, the legisla-
tive and executive branches together comprise the parliament,
and the executive branch is formed from within parliament
(and is accordingly dependent upon its confidence). 35 In prac-
tice, this means that the executive branch must be supported by
a majority in the parliament. In this sense, a parliamentary re-
gime can be characterized as a system of mutual dependence. 36
Government ministers are usually members of parliament and
are, in any case, politically responsible to the legislature. Al-
though some parliamentary systems have a symbolic or ceremo-
nial head of government (such as a president or a monarch), it is
the prime minister that is the true head of government, and
who, together with the cabinet, exercises the principal executive
powers. 37 With respect to the duration of electoral mandates, a
government can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence from
the parliament. If it chooses, however, the government also has
the capacity to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 38
The prototype for this "pure" model of parliamentarianism is
the United Kingdom.3 9
B. The "Pure" Presidential Model
In a "pure" presidential system, a president is popularly
elected for a fixed term either by the citizenry or via an electoral
33 See generally Oleg Protysk, Do Institutions Matter? Semi-presidentialism in
Comparative Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSI-
TIONS AFTER COMMUNISM 17 (John S. Micgiel ed., 1997); and PARLIAMENT AND DEM-
OCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SouRTHERN EUROPE (U. Liebert & M. Catta eds., 1990).
34 See LIJPHART, supra note 13, at 6.
35 Id.
36 See Stepan & Skach, supra note 31, at 120.
37 See LIJPHART, supra note 13, at 6, 72.
38 See id. at 68.
39 Id. at 5.
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college, and accordingly is not politically dependent on parlia-
mentary votes of confidence. 40 The president usually wields con-
siderable constitutional powers, generally including complete
control of the composition of the cabinet and administration
(subject to confirmation by the legislature). In addition to being
the holder of executive powers, the president is also the sym-
bolic head of state and cannot be removed from office between
elections except by extraordinary impeachment procedures. 41
However, in contrast to the semi-presidential system, under the
presidential system, the president does not usually have the
power to dissolve the legislature and call new elections. Also, in
contrast to the parliamentary system, Cabinet Members do not
sit in the legislature. Finally, with regard to the legislative
branch, its members are directly elected for a fixed term by the
citizenry.42 The prototype for this "pure" model of presidential-
ism is the United States. 43
C. The "Pure" Semi-presidential Model
Semi-presidentialism, which has also been described both
as a "dual executive" system and a "semi-parliamentary" sys-
tem, is, in many ways, a hybrid form of presidentialism and par-
liamentarianism. 44 Generally, semi-presidential systems have
(i) a president as the head of state who is directly elected by the
citizenry, rather than nominated by the parliament, and (ii) an
indirectly elected prime minister, who usually must be sup-
ported by the parliament. As in parliamentarianism, the prime
minister exercises significant powers. In this model, however,
the president also has significant powers. 45 For example, with
40 Id.at 68.
41 See id.
42 See Stepan & Skach, supra note 31, at 120.
43 See generally James L. Sundquist, The U.S. Presidential System as a Model
for the World, in DESIGNS, supra note 31, at 120.
4 See generally Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-Pres-
idential Government, 8 EuR. J. POL. RESEARCH 165 (1980). Following the reason-
ing of Duverger, some political scientists describe the semi-presidential system not
as a synthesis of parliamentary and presidential systems, but as a system that
alternates between parliamentary and presidential phases. This characterization
flows from the fact that the president is, to some extent, only the supreme author-
ity in circumstances where his or her party also has a majority in parliament. He
or she must cede considerable power to the prime minister when his or her party is
in the minority in parliament. See id.
45 See id. at 166; see also Suleiman, supra note 31, at 144.
263
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
the consent of the prime minister, the president typically has
the power to dissolve parliament.46 In addition, as in the case
of presidentialism, the president usually has the power to either
veto certain acts of parliament or ask for reconsideration of
bills.47 Moreover, while law-making is primarily a parliamen-
tary prerogative, some legislative functions can be shifted to the
president who may legislate in those areas by decree.48 With
respect to cabinet composition, semi-presidentialism is similar
to presidentialism inasmuch as members of cabinet do not typi-
cally come from parliament (with the exception of the prime
minister). The prototype for this "pure" model of semi-presiden-
tialism is the French Fifth Republic. 49
III. CASE STUDIES
Having outlined the thesis, assumptions and limitations of
this article, and having provided a set of operational definitions,
there will now be an examination of the three case studies:
Spain, Argentina and Poland. For each case study, there will be
(i) a brief review of the history of the transition, (ii) an assess-
ment regarding whether the country's choice of political model
advanced the goal of cooperative governance, and whether the
goal could have been better achieved under one of the other po-
litical models, and (iii) an assessment regarding whether the
country's choice of political model advanced the goal of flexible
governance, and whether the goal could have been better
achieved under one of the other political models.
A. The Parliamentary Experience: Spain
Spain was the first country in the "third wave" of demo-
cratic transitions to adopt a parliamentary model of govern-
ance. 50 Before its transition to democracy in the mid 1970s,
46 See Stepan & Skach, supra note 31, at 149.
47 See Robert Elgie, France, in SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE 75-76 (Rob-
ert Elgie ed., 1999).
48 See id.
49 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 279.
50 Portugal and Greece completed democratic transitions at around the same
time as Spain. Portugal adopted the semi-presidential model, but the powers of
the president have been constitutionally reduced and since 1988 Portugal has in-
creasingly functioned as a parliamentary system. Greece adopted the parliamen-
tary model. See id. at 141.
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Spain had spent almost forty years under the dictatorship of
General Francisco Franco. 51 With the death of Franco in No-
vember 1975, the process of transition commenced in earnest, a
process that is considered by many to be the paradigmatic ex-
ample of a non-violent "pacted transition."52
Although the Franco regime was clearly authoritarian, it
was well short of being totalitarian. 53 Moreover, unlike the mil-
itary regimes in Greece and in Latin America, Franco estab-
lished a working institutional and constitutional structure in
his final years. This included an official single party (the "Fa-
lange"), a prime ministerial office, an advisory institution (the
"Council of the Realm"), a monarchy (in the person of King Juan
Carlos), and a legislature (the "Cortes" - which did little more
than ratify executive decrees).54 As a result, from the start of
the transition in Spain, consideration was given to institutional
reforms based on an existing structure. 55 Not surprisingly,
therefore, the first major legislative act of the transition was
the passage of the Law for Political Reform 56 , which effectively
configured the existing institutions into a parliamentary
monarchy. 57
The passage of the law also opened the door for the first
free elections in forty years, which were held in June 1977.58
The results of that first election reflected the divided society
that Spain was: the moderate Union of the Democratic Center
party (UDC) (led by Adolfo Suarez) obtained 34.9% of the vote;
51 See generally SHEELAGH M. ELLWOOD, FRANco (Keith Robbins ed., Long-
man Publishing 1994).
52 See JOSEPH M. COLMER, GAME THEORY AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
THE SPANISH MODEL (1995). A "pacted transition" refers to a transition to democ-
racy in which a pact is made between "regime moderates" and "opposition moder-
ates" who are both able to use and contain their respective "hardliners." This is
also referred to as a "four-player game theory model." For an analysis of how this
model was applied in the case of Spain, see id.
53 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 38-54, where the authors an-
alyze the differences between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes.
54 Id. at 91.
55 Id. at 89-91.
56 Id. at 94-95. It was enacted by the still-unelected Cortes in November
1976. Id. at 95.
57 This was subsequently formalized in Article 1(3) of the Spanish Constitu-
tion, which provides: "The political form of the Spanish State is the parliamentary
Monarchy" CONSTITUTION OF SPAIN, art. 1(3), translation available at www.uni-
wuerzburg.delaw/sp00000_.html.
55 See Presidentialism, supra note 18, at 131.
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the Socialists (led by Felipe Gonzalez) 29.4%; the Communists
9.3%; and the rightist Popular Alliance party 8.4%.59 Since no
party had more than a plurality of seats, this led to a search for
coalitions. This type of coalition building is a constitutive char-
acteristic of parliamentary systems.60 Simply put, under a par-
liamentary system with no clear party majority, there is an
institutional incentive for power-sharing and coalition-forming
between parties, as it is only in a coalition that any of the par-
ties can enjoy a substantive stake in the system as a whole. In
the case of Spain, a coalition was formed between two political
nemeses - the UDC and the Popular Alliance. This coalition
combined to take majority control of the parliament.6 1 Suarez
was chosen to serve as prime minister. 62 Over the subsequent
three years, the coalition provided the united and effective gov-
ernance that is so crucial in the earliest years of a democratic
transition. It is also noteworthy that although Suarez had very
strong public support as prime minister, he never tried to stake
out independent or antagonistic positions against the legisla-
ture.63 This can be explained by the fact that in a parliamen-
tary system, the prime minister cannot help but remain keenly
aware that he or she needs the ongoing support of his or her
parliamentary coalition in order to continue to serve as its
leader.
Would the same positive results in terms of cooperative
governance have obtained if Spain had instead adopted a presi-
dential or semi-presidential system rather than a parliamen-
tary system? The answer is probably no. First, in both
presidential and semi-presidential systems, coalition building is
inherently more difficult because of the existence of a presi-
dency possessed of robust dejure and de facto powers. 64 When a
political party takes the presidency in such systems, there is
institutionally less incentive for it to form a coalition in the leg-
islature because, unlike in a parliamentary system (where shar-
ing power is the only way for a party to obtain any significant
stake in the system), the holding of the presidency already af-
59 See id at 131.
60 See id. at 131-133.
61 See id. at 132.
62 See id. at 131.
63 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 93-98.
64 See MARvALL, supra note 6, at 6-10.
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fords a substantive stake in the system, and one which is guar-
anteed for a fixed term.6 5 Thus, had Suarez been elected
President in a presidential or semi-presidential system, it is
less likely (although not impossible) that his UDC party col-
leagues would have formed a coalition with the Popular
Alliance.
Second, both presidential and semi-presidential elections
tend to operate according to the rule of "winner-take-all," in
which winners and losers of the election are sharply defined for
the entire period of the presidential mandate. The problem is
that this zero-sum game tends to create polarization and con-
flict between the executive and legislative branches whenever a
political party wins one contest (e.g., the presidential election)
but loses the other (e.g., the legislative elections). In a presi-
dential or semi-presidential Spain, such conflict would likely
have arisen because the UDC would have held the presidency
(i.e., Suarez), but not the legislature.66  Of course, this type of
conflict can largely be avoided by the president's party forming
a coalition in the legislature. As just noted, however, such coali-
tions are less likely to form in a presidential or semi-presiden-
tial system.67
We now turn to the second assertion about the comparative
advantage of parliamentarianism in the context of a democratic
transition: its capacity to effect fluid changes in government or
leadership when public support dips too low or in times of crisis.
First, returning to events in Spain, by 1981 Suarez had become
somewhat discredited as prime minister. Ultimately, he was
compelled by the coalition to resign.68 The parliamentary coali-
tion itself, however, remained intact and a successor prime min-
65 See generally LIJPHART, supra note 13.
66 See Presidentialism, supra note 18, at 131-133.
67 It should be noted, however, that this dynamic is more attenuated under
semi-presidentialism in the event of "co-habitation" (i.e., when the president does
not control a majority in parliament, but the prime minister does). In such circum-
stances, the parliament enjoys almost as much de facto power as the presidency.
Because the president remains the chief executive of government and retains sub-
stantial powers, however, even "co-habitation" produces fewer incentives for power
sharing than a pure parliamentary system.
8 See Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 14, at 30. By the
middle of 1980, public support for Suarez had fallen to 26%. In fairness, the drop
was also due to an internal crisis within the UDC party, an economic recession,
and renewed Basque terrorism. See id.
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ister was chosen by the coalition in a series of simple steps.
The fluidity of this change of leadership turned out to be critical
because it coincided with the final throes of the old authorita-
rian regime that shortly thereafter made an unsuccessful at-
tempt at a coup. 69 A second illustration of parliamentary
flexibility came in the following year. As it turned out, the new
prime minister, Calvo Sotelo, proved unable to hold the coali-
tion together and public support for the coalition suffered a
sharp decline. 70 As a result, Sotelo decided to dissolve the Cor-
tes and call for new elections. This permitted Felipe Gonzalez
and his Socialist Party to assume power with an overwhelming
majority that ended up governing Spain for the next twelve
years. 71 Thus, both in the Suarez and the Sotelo examples, the
flexibility of the parliamentary system permitted very smooth,
crisis-free transitions in power, thereby ensuring that support
for democracy in Spain did not diminish.
Would these smooth transitions have occurred if Spain had
instead adopted a presidential or semi-presidential system?
Once again, the answer is probably no. First, had Suarez been
an independently elected president, there would have been lit-
tle institutional leverage to force his resignation (since im-
peachment would have been impossible given the electoral
results). There would, therefore, have been greater incentive
for him to linger ineffectually in office until the end of his fixed
term. This might also have undermined the government's abil-
ity to survive the coup attempt, and would likely have caused a
serious decline in public support for democracy. 72 Second, in
the Sotelo example above, the power to call new elections with
such ease and speed was critical in preventing the coalition's
internal crisis from transforming into a crisis of regime. Under
a semi-presidential or presidential scenario, however, the legis-
lative branch would have had no power to call new elections. 73
This would have caused a real risk of the emergence of a situa-
69 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 89.
70 Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Profile, Spain at 5 (1999/2000).
71 Juan J. Linz, The Virtues of Parliamentarianism, in THE GLOBAL RESUR-
GENCE, supra note 10, at 156 [hereinafter Parliamentarianism].
72 This is precisely what happened under very similar circumstances during
Garcia's presidency in Peru. See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 156.
73 See Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 4, at 8-10; and
Elgie, supra note 47, at 75-6.
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tion of government paralysis in which the legislative and execu-
tive branches would simply have become "stuck" with each
other until the end of the presidential mandate7 4
Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, Spain's adoption of a
parliamentary constitutional framework seems to have been the
right choice. Today Spain is a deeply consolidated democracy in
which (i) a clear majority of public opinion believes that democ-
racy is the most appropriate form of political governance, and
(ii) there is a strong tradition of resolving conflict within the
rules of the country's democratic process. 75 Is this success the
direct result of Spain's choice of a parliamentary system?
Clearly not. However, the choice of a parliamentary system -
and in particular its capacity to promote cooperative and flexi-
ble governance - does appear to provide at least a partial ex-
planation for this success.
B. The Presidential Experience: Argentina
Argentina was the first country in the cycle of successful
democratic transitions that swept South America in the 1980s
to adopt a presidential model of governance. 76 Before its transi-
tion to democracy, Argentina had spent seven years under the
dictatorship of a vicious military regime. 77 In terms of the chief
characteristics of the system in place in Argentina at the time,
at least three things should be noted. First, unlike its counter-
74 Semi-presidentialism mitigates this dynamic to some extent by virtue of
the fact that the president has the power to dissolve parliament. Such power is,
however, exercised rarely because of the damaging effect it would have on the pres-
ident's public support and because of the dangerous precedent it would set for dem-
ocratic practices in government. In contrast, in a parliamentary system, there is
generally no danger to democracy when new elections are called because it is per-
fectly acceptable under the system rules, and the decision is made collectively by
the parliament rather than by one person. See Presidential or Parliamentary De-
mocracy, supra note 4, at 48-49.
75 For further analysis of the democratic consolidation in Spain, see DEMO-
CRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 108-15.
76 In truth, the presidential system was not so much "adopted" in Argentina
as it was "restored" via the prior democratic constitution. See id. at 202. While
this decision to restore rather than replace the previous democratic system may
have allowed the country to avoid a potentially divisive national debate, it also
precluded an examination of whether the previous system had itself contributed to
the democratic breakdown.
77 See generally NONCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED (Universitaria de Buenos Aires ed., 1986).
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part in Brazil, the Argentine military government never created
parties or held elections during its years in power.78 Second,
unlike the regimes in Uruguay and Chile, the Argentine regime
never developed a so-called "guided democracy" constitution.
7 9
And third, at the time of the transition, the economy was in
ruins due in large part to the disastrous war with the British in
Malvinas."" As a result, when the Argentine military finally
surrendered in disgrace to the British in 1982, not only was the
collapse of the regime as a whole very swift, but the Argentine
military also found itself unable to impose significant con-
straining conditions (initially at least) on the successor govern-
ment as a price of transition.8 ' Nevertheless, the relationship
between the armed forces and the new civilian government re-
mained a crucial issue.
The first democratic elections following the demise of the
regime took place in 1983. The Radical Party candidate, Radl
Alfonsin, was elected as Argentina's new president.8 2 Under
the constitution in place at that time, this meant he would pre-
side for a fixed term of six years.8 3 However, Alfonsin's party
failed to capture a majority in both houses of the legislature.
This failure was repeated in each election that took place dur-
ing his tenure as President.8 4 This prompted the President to
generally try to work around, rather than with, the legislature.
As for the legislature (and particularly the Peronist-controlled
Senate), it generally engaged in an "opposition for opposition's
78 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 190.
79 Id. at 190-91.
80 See Carlos Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into
Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L. J. 2619, 2622 (1991).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See article 77 of the previous Argentine Constitution (original Spanish ver-
sion), available at www.georgetown.edu/LatAmerPolitical/Constitutions/Argen-
tina/arg1860.html. As a result of constitutional amendments adopted in 1994, the
presidential term has been reduced to four years. Section 90 of the current Argen-
tine Constitution reads: "The President and Vice-President shall hold their offices
for the term of four years; and they may be re-elected or may succeed each other for
only one consecutive term . . ."; ARGENTINE CONST., art. 77 (English translation),
available at http://www.uni-wuerburg.de/law/arOO00.html.
84 From 1983 to 1987 the Radicals had a slight majority in the Chamber of
Deputies, but not in the Senate; and from 1987-1989, the Radicals controlled
neither of the houses. See Mark P. Jones, Evaluating Argentina's Presidential De-
mocracy: 1983-1995, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, 265-
66 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Shugart eds., 1997).
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sake" style of politics during Alfonsin's term in office.8 5 Thus,
the election results - combined with the presidential system -
produced a classic dynamic of confrontation between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government.8 6
Three examples of this dynamic from the Argentine experi-
ence stand out each of which had a deeply negative effect on
public confidence in government. First, by 1985, Argentina was
in desperate need of an economic stabilization plan to curb spi-
ralling levels of inflation.8 7 The Alfonsin administration's plan
(known as the "Austral Plan") was conceived in secrecy by a
group of technocrats that had been give control of the Econom-
ics Ministry. It was then imposed on the country by emergency
decree.8 8 The total lack of consultation with the legislature pre-
dictably drew the ire of both the opposition Peronists, who held
a majority in the Senate at the time, and the "Confederaci6n
General de Trabao", the predominant trade union body that
has historically been linked to the Peronists.8 9 As a result, in
part because of Alfonsin's non-consultative approach, the Aus-
tral Plan was abandoned leaving the country in a new and even
more precarious economic bind.90 Second, in Argentina, there
was a vigorous effort made by the government to prosecute
members of the armed forces suspected of having committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity.91 When difficulties in
carrying out these prosecutions began to emerge, the Peronists
85 See generally James McGuire, Political Parties and Democracy in Argen-
tina, in BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA,
223-39 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995).
86 See generally Carlos Nino, Hyperpresidentialism and Constitutional Reform
in Argentina, in INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, 167-69 (Arend
Lijphart & Carlos Waisman, eds., 1996).
87 See Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, in THE GLOBAL RESUR-
GENCE, supra note 10, at 102.
88 See generally Marcelo Cavarozzi & Oscar Landi, Political Parties under Al-
fonsin and Menem: The Effects of State Shrinking and the Devaluation of Demo-
cratic Politics, in THE NEW ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY 180-81 (Edward C. Epstein ed.,
1992).
89 See id. at 182-84; see also Deward C. Epstein, Labor-State Conflict in the
New Argentine Democracy: Parties, Union Factions, and Power Maximizing, in
THE NEW ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY, supra note 88, at 134-35.
90 See Political Parties, in THE NEW ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY, supra note 88, at
183; see also DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 193.
91 See generally NINO, supra note 6, at 41-104.
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used this as a political opportunity to damage the presidency.92
This ultimately caused the government to reverse course on its
prosecution strategy, to the detriment of the military regime's
many victims. Third, the President's term was marred by no
less than thirteen general strikes. 93 This is largely explained
by the fact that the overwhelming majority of trade unions
(most of which were aligned with the Peronists) were en-
couraged by the Peronist opposition to make things difficult for
the President.94 This labor turmoil considerably undermined
the pace and success of the transition.
What might have happened if Argentina had instead
adopted a parliamentary or semi-presidential system of govern-
ment rather than a presidential system at the beginning of its
transition? First, under a parliamentary system, there would
have been no independently elected president, and therefore, all
of the parties in parliament would have had a strong incentive
to seek out coalition arrangements. In addition, once a coalition
is established in a parliamentary system, it is generally in the
self-interest of coalition members to seek consensus in policy-
making in as much as continuity in power is dependent on con-
tinuity of coalitions. In point of fact, like Alfonsin in Argentina,
Suarez in Spain initially considered making the Spanish stabili-
zation plan an executive decision. Unlike Alfonsin, however, he
quickly realized that it would be more legitimate and more ef-
fective to arrive at a consensual agreement with the other mem-
bers of the parliamentary coalition.9 5 That is ultimately what
he did, and in contrast to the Austral Plan, the Spanish plan
never needed to be abandoned.9 6
With respect to what might have happened in Argentina
under a semi-presidential system, the picture is less clear.
First, the electoral results would have probably created a situa-
92 For instance, the Peronists abstained from sending congressmen to the Na-
tional Commission on Disappeared Persons, knowing that their lack of participa-
tion would affect the legitimacy of the Commission and therefore the President.
They also took every opportunity to criticize the President's approach as overly
lenient to the military, even though it was probably clear to most Argentineans
that the government was doing its utmost to take an aggressive approach in the
circumstances. See generally Nn'o, supra note 80, at 2636.
93 See DEMOCRATIC TRANsITION, supra note 2, at 193.
94 See id. at 191-93.
95 See id. at 90.
96 See id.
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tion of "co-habitation," thereby building a kind of mutual depen-
dency between the president and the parliament. However, the
potential for executive-legislative gridlock or conflict would still
have been present for the simple reason that, in semi-presiden-
tial and presidential systems alike, the president has an inde-
pendent and powerful mandate from the citizens which he or
she can invoke when the legislature fails to cooperate. Second,
because the Radicals would have held the presidency under a
semi-presidential model, there would also have been less incen-
tive for them to seek to form a coalition in the legislature. On
the other hand, in a semi-presidential system, the Radicals
would also have appreciated the fact that unless they tried to
form a coalition, they would not likely see one of their own en-
dorsed by the legislature as the new prime minister (who in a
"co-habitation" situation enjoys powers very near to that of a
president). Thus, while there would have been more incentive
for cooperative politics in Argentina under semi-presidentialism
than there was under presidentialism, there would nevertheless
have been more incentives for such cooperation under parlia-
mentarianism than under semi-presidentialism.
The second deficiency I have associated with presidential-
ism in the context of a democratic transition is its weak capacity
for promoting crisis-free changes in government or leadership. 97
This weakness is well documented by an example from the Ar-
gentine transition. In October 1987, Alfonsin's party lost con-
trol of both houses of the legislature, but he remained
President.98 In effect, this meant that the country would have
to endure the rigidity of a commitment to a failed administra-
tion that no longer enjoyed its support. As a result, executive-
legislative cooperation virtually disappeared in Argentina, and
the country experienced various national traumas for the next
two years of the Alfonsin administration. These included four
attempted military coups, and hyperinflation due to policy-mak-
ing paralysis. 99 By June 1988, the government's approval rat-
97 See Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 4, at 9.
98 Although the Radicals lost control of both houses, they did not lose enough
seats to create the necessary votes for an impeachment. See Democratic Transi-
tion, supra note 2, at 193-194.
99 See DEMOCRATIc TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 194. See also Debate Over
Constitutional Reform in Latin America, supra note 32, at 643 (where the author
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ing stood at 12%.100 Alfonsin was finally compelled to resign six
months early in order to prevent a major political/constitutional
crisis.10 '
Could these traumas have been avoided or mitigated if Ar-
gentina had instead adopted a parliamentary or semi-presiden-
tial system? First, under a parliamentary system, a prime
minister whose party had lost control of both houses of parlia-
ment as a result of mid-term elections, as occurred in Argen-
tina, would have simply been forced out by a vote of no
confidence. Indeed, the absence of a fixed and independent elec-
toral mandate for the executive branch in a parliamentary sys-
tem simply precludes any scenario such as the one described. 10 2
As to the probable course of events under a semi-presidential
model, it seems likely that the problems would have been com-
parable to those actually experienced in Argentina. To wit,
there would have been the same lack of incentives or institu-
tional escape valves to persuade or force an unwilling President
Alfonsin to leave office before the conclusion of his fixed electo-
ral term. In short, as in Argentina, it would likely have taken
an extreme social and political crisis to force a resolution of the
issue under a semi-presidential model.
In spite of these and other destabilizing incidents during
the transitional years, Argentine democracy today is in a rela-
tively robust state. 0 3 It would, however, be an overstatement
to characterize Argentine democracy as fully consolidated. 0 4
The main deficiency in Argentine democracy remains the ab-
sence of a strong tradition of the rule of law and respect for ordi-
nary democratic procedures. Indeed, Alfonsin's successor,
discusses how executive-legislative conflict can create dangerous power vacuums
that get filled by "corporate groups" such as the military and the private sector).
100 See id. at 194.
101 See Arturo Valenzuela, Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in
Chile, in THE FAILURE, supra note 2, at 141.
102 See Parliamentarism, supra note 71, at 156.
103 See, e.g., Freedom House, Freedom in the World (1999/2000), Argentina
Country Report, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey/2000/reports/country/ar-
gent.html; see also NINO, supra note 86, at 173, (regarding the 1994 constitutional
reforms referred to earlier in the article, which appear to have mitigated a few of
the worst features of Argentine presidentialism).
104 In fact, it is still difficult to characterize as "consolidated" any of the presi-
dential democracies that underwent democratic transitions in South America in
the 1980s, including Uruguay, Brazil and even Chile. See generally DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION, supra note 2.
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Carlos Menem, showed a marked disdain for democratic values
and institutions that went largely unchecked for ten years. 10 5
For example, during his first four years in power, when his
party enjoyed a majority in both houses of the legislature, he
took advantage of this situation and a clause in the constitution
permitting the issuance of "necessary and urgent" decrees, ulti-
mately issuing 244 decrees. Only 4% of these decrees were
passed through the full ratification process in the legislature. 10 6
Similarly, when faced with the prospect of political resistance
by the Supreme Court, he increased the number of judges from
five to nine to enable himself to appoint political allies to the
Court and get the judgment he desired.' 07 Whether the new
president of Argentina can overcome these and other pitfalls of
presidential government and consolidate democracy, remains to
be seen.'0 8
C. The Semi-presidential Experience: Poland
Poland was the first country in the cycle of democratic tran-
sitions in Eastern Europe to adopt a semi-presidential model of
governance.' 0 9 Before its transition to democracy, Poland had
spent almost forty-five years under Soviet occupation and domi-
105 See generally DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 200-204.
106 See id. at 201. Several examples of such decrees are reviewed in Delia Fer-
reira Rubio & Matteo Goretti, When the President Governs Alone: The "Decretazo"
in Argentina, 1989-1993, in EXECUTWE DECREE AUTHORITY, 33-61 (John M. Carey
& Matthew Shugart eds., 1998).
107 See DEMOCRATIC TRANsrrION, supra note 2, at 201. Menem's behavior in
office exhibits all of the signs of Latin American "delegated democracy." The
"signs" of delegated democracy are: (i) presidents who see and place themselves as
"above" parties; (ii) presidents who view the legislature and the judiciary as a nui-
sance and an impediment to effective government; (iii) presidents who see them-
selves as the "alpha" of politics, and their staff as the "omega"; and (iv) presidents
that insulate themselves from any potential oppositional forces and seek to become
the sole person responsible for their policies. See generally O'DONNELL, supra note
87.
108 See CNN Online edition, November 1, 1999, available at http://eu-
rope.cnn.comWORLD/world.report/indexll.01.html. The new president, Presi-
dent Fernando de la Rua of the center-left Alliance Party, was elected to a term of
four years on October 24, 1999.
13' See Freedom House, Freedom in the world, at http://www.freedomhouse.
org. Albania, Moldova, Romania, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania
have all opted for semi-presidential systems as well. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary opted for parliamentary systems. See id.
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nation. 110 Resistance to the Russian presence was always
strong, particularly on the part of the Catholic church (which
had always retained a sphere of relative autonomy from the re-
gime), and on the part of the labor movement (notably the self-
governing unions which were formed under the guidance of Sol-
idarity which, at its peak, represented ten million workers)."'
It wasn't until early 1989, however, after almost a decade of
martial law and intense labor strife, that the regime led by Gen-
eral Jaruzelski agreed to conduct the so-called "Round Table
Talks" regarding the future of democracy in Poland.112
In general, the Polish transition - and particularly the
Round Table Talks process - reflected the classic pattern of a
pacted transition. What was unusual about the transition pro-
cess in Poland, however, was how much the incumbent regime
overestimated its strength and popularity, and how little the
opposition appreciated its own. 1 3 As for the content of the pact
that ultimately emerged from the Talks, the most important
point for present purposes is that it provided for a semi-presi-
dential form of government." 4 However, at least three other
points should also be noted in this context. First, like other
post-Communist countries, Poland faced what was known as
the "simultaneity problem" (i.e., the problem of having to simul-
taneously establish both a constitutional democracy and a mar-
ket economy). 1 5 Second, after forty-five years of single-party
state rule, "party politics" had developed a very negative conno-
tation in Poland, a factor that considerably slowed the develop-
110 See generally JACEK JEDRUCH, CONSTITUTIONS, ELECTIONS AND LEGISLA-
TURES OF POLAND:1493-1993, 307-41 (1998).
111 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 256-57, and 261-62.
112 See generally Elster, supra note 25, at 202-06.
113 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 266. This misunderstanding
on both sides was best highlighted by the results of the first semi-free elections in
June 1989, in which Solidarity achieved an unexpected and overwhelming success
over the Communists. See id.
114 The powers assigned to the president under the pact were very broad, but
vaguely defined. Presidential powers included a limited power to dismiss the
prime minister, and seemingly unfettered power over matters such as foreign pol-
icy, defense and national security. See Jon Elster, Afterword, in PoSTCOMMuNIsT
PRESIDENCIES, at 229-30; see also Krzysztof Jasiewica, Poland: Walesa's Legacy to
the Presidency, in POSTCOMMrNIST PRESIDENCIES, at 133-48.
115 Elster, supra note 25, at 170-73.
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ment of a political society.116 Third, Poland in transition lacked
a tradition of the rule of law, due largely to communism's sub-
stitution of policy for law. All of these factors impacted the
speed and the process of the democratic transition in Poland.117
Turning to the initial election in Poland, the first fully com-
petitive presidential election took place in December 1990, and
was won by Lech Walesa. He had campaigned on an explicitly
anti-party platform, but was clearly identified as being part of
the Solidarity camp. Then in October 1991, Poland held its first
fully competitive elections for both houses of the legislature.
The results were alarming in two respects: (i) only 43% of the
electorate participated in the elections; and (ii) twenty-nine par-
ties ended up being represented in the lower house, with no
party receiving even 14% of the vote."18 Although coalition
building was clearly not going to be easy, the semi-presidential
system in Poland made matters worse. First, coalition building
proved extremely difficult because Solidarity-identified parties
felt they had won the presidency, and therefore saw less need to
form a coalition in the legislature. Second, and more signifi-
cantly, coalition building was impeded by the "dual executive"
nature of semi-presidential systems, which requires that a
prime minister obtain the support of both the president and the
legislature. In a legislature as divided as that in Poland, this
was virtually impossible to achieve." 9 As a result, it took two
crisis-like months just to form a coalition, and the new govern-
116 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 269-272. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that almost none of the major political movements in Eastern
Europe called themselves "parties", including "Solidarity" in Poland. Indeed, so
intent were the Poles on avoiding routine party politics, that oppositional behavior
evolved into a general principle known as the "politics of anti-politics." See gener-
ally DAVID OST, SOLIDARITY AND THE POLITICS OF ANTI-POLITICS: OPPOSITION AND
REFORM IN POLAND SINCE 1968 (1990).
117 See generally Elster, supra note 25, at 202-14.
118 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 275-276. This problem of ex-
cess representation was fixed (in part) by an electoral law reform enacted in 1993
which provided that a party could not be represented in the lower house unless it
received more than 5% of the national vote. See id. at 287.
119 The Polish version of semi-presidentialism was particularly unwieldy dur-
ing the transitional period. See, e.g., POLAND SMALL CONST., art. 57, 58, 59, 60 and
62. These articles in effect formalized the structure that had been in existence
since the transition began in 1989 vis-a-vis the nomination and appointment of
prime ministers. See translated version of the Small Constitution from the origi-
nal Polish by the University of Wuerzburg, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.
de/law/p102000_.html.
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ment went through three prime ministers in the first seven
months.
To make matters worse, even after the formation of the coa-
lition in Poland, the president and the legislature quickly fell
into a classic pattern of executive-legislative conflict. The con-
flict was particularly acute in Poland because of the combina-
tion of (i) a semi-presidential governance structure, and (ii)
election results in which neither the president nor the prime
minister controlled a party majority.120 In Poland, this awk-
ward mix played out in particularly dangerous ways during the
course of the constitution-making process that followed the elec-
tions. Although an interim constitution was ultimately agreed
to, 121 the intense conflicts which surfaced during the process be-
tween the president, the prime minister and the legislature ex-
acted high price on the new democracy in the form of further
public disillusionment in both politicians and the political pro-
cess. 122 This disillusionment only became worse with time as
relations between the two executives (i.e., between the prime
minister and the president) and between each of them and the
legislature transformed into a seemingly endless stream of mu-
tual recriminations.
Would these same negative results have obtained if Poland
had adopted a parliamentary or presidential system, rather
than a semi-presidential system? First, under a parliamentary
model, there would have been no independently elected presi-
dent, and therefore, no need for presidential approval of a prime
minister. This would obviously have made it much easier for a
coalition to form, since (i) the parties in parliament would have
all had an equal interest in forming a coalition, and (ii) once
formed, there would have been no need for a separate and inde-
pendent approval from a president. Moreover, following coali-
120 See generally LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 28. It should be noted that this
situation i.e., where neither the president nor the prime minister control a party
majority, has to date been avoided in the French Fifth Republic. See DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 279. We can speculate that such a situation would
present problems far more grave for good governance than the relatively workable
circumstance of "co-habitation" in which the president does not control a majority
but the prime minister does. Indeed, this exact scenario has already led to armed
struggle in other parts of Eastern Europe including, inter alia, Russia and Geor-
gia. See id. at 278.
121 See generally OST, supra note 116.
122 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSTION, supra note 2, at 283-87.
[Vol. 12:253278
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol12/iss2/3
2000] FRAMEWORKS AND FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES
tion formation, the government in a parliamentary system does
not have the option of de-legitimizing the legislature since the
legislature and executive are fused in a parliamentary sys-
tem.123 This is not to suggest that if Poland had adopted a par-
liamentary system that it would have avoided all of the crises
that occurred in the early years of the transition. The coopera-
tion advantages of a parliamentary system, however, would cer-
tainly have helped mitigate the severity of the crises and their
attendant harm to public enthusiasm for democracy.
In contrast, had Poland been operating under a presiden-
tial model, there would have been difficulties in forming a coali-
tion because of the sentiment among Solidarity-identified
parties that they held the presidency. 124 On the other hand, co-
alition building under a presidential system would have
avoided the additional impediment of collective decision-mak-
ing over a second executive (i.e., the prime minister). Similarly,
although one could reasonably predict that presidentialism
would have produced the same executive-legislative conflict in
Poland (given that the president did not enjoy a legislative ma-
jority), the conflicts would probably have been less drawn out
because of the fact that presidentialism provides for only one
executive position, not two.125
We now turn to the second deficiency that has been associ-
ated with semi-presidentialism in the context of a democratic
transition, viz., its weak capacity to effect rapid and smooth
changes in government or leadership when public support dips
too low or in times of crisis. In Poland, President Walensa's ap-
proval rating had dropped to 20% by 1993, the lowest approval
rating for a president in all of Eastern Europe at that time.1 26
However, Walensa continued to believe that he had a "special
relationship" with the Polish citizenry, and frequently alter-
nated between ridiculing the parliament and threatening to dis-
solve it in the name of "the people." 27 Some commentators
123 See LIJPHART supra note 13, at 68.
124 See generally Ania van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska, Poland, in SEMI-PRE-
SIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE, supra note 47, at 175-87.
125 See LIJPHART, supra note 13 at 76.
126 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 286. Even the level of trust in
his government was higher, at 25%. See id.
127 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 287 (quoting speech by
Walensa). A similar dynamic existed under President Collor in Brazil who,
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were in fact worried about his presidential aspirations leading
to an "executive coup against the politicians," especially after he
failed to achieve the increases in presidential powers which he
had been seeking since his inauguration as president. 128 The
semi-presidential system, however, precluded his removal in
the absence of impeachment-level consensus, something that
would have been impossible at any point during Walensa's term
in office. As a result, Walesa stayed on as President until the
end of his term in 1995, only narrowly averting a major politi-
cal/constitutional crisis.129
Could this situation have been avoided or mitigated if Po-
land had instead adopted a parliamentary or presidential sys-
tem? First, under a presidential system, the forced removal of
Walensa would have been impossible for the same reason that it
was under semi-presidentialism, viz., because of the lack of im-
peachment-level consensus in the legislature. In addition, be-
cause of the independent mandate to govern for a fixed term
that is provided to a president in a presidential system (as in a
semi-presidential system), the institutional incentive for a pres-
ident to voluntarily cede power even when he or she becomes
extremely unpopular is very weak.130 In contrast, had Walensa
instead been a prime minister in a parliamentary Poland, he
could have been removed by a simple vote of no confidence -
something which would not have happened during the early
years when he was popular both inside and outside the legisla-
ture, but which clearly needed to and would have happened by
1993 when Walensa's popularity was extremely low.' 3 1 And
yet, it must be conceded that Polish politics was so disorganized
and divided during the early years of the transition that it is
doubtful that any system, including parliamentarianism, could
have averted the significant loss of public support for politicians
and democracy that occurred. Under a parliamentary govern-
backed by a party that controlled less than 5% of the legislature in 1990, at-
tempted to characterize the legislature as "out of touch" with the citizenry in the
classic anti-politics and anti-party approach that presidentialism and semi-pre-
sidentialism have tended to produce in Latin America and Eastern Europe. See id.
at 170.
128 JADWIGA STANISZKIS, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
27 (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1992).
129 See Van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska, supra note 124, 182-87.
130 See Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy, supra note 4, at 9.
131 See DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 287.
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ment in Poland, however, there would have at least been some
flexibility in attempting to meet public expectations through
changes in leadership.
As to the state of Polish democracy today, things have very
much improved. Indeed, in spite of the many crises and con-
flicts that plagued the first five years, Polish democracy did not
break down, and Poland even stands a good chance of becoming
a member of the European Union at some point in the next few
years.'3 2 This significant improvement is no doubt due, in part,
to the fact that Poland adopted a new constitution in April
1997, which established a system more similar to parliamentar-
ianism. This system has thus far produced a much higher qual-
ity of domestic politics than the prior system.133 Whether
Poland can now consolidate democracy within the new system
remains to be seen. By choosing a more parliamentary system
- with its seemingly superior capacity for promoting coopera-
tive and flexible governance - Poland is at least no longer play-
ing against the odds.' 3 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The chief purpose of this article was to attempt to assess
which of the three most common models of political governance
- parliamentarianism, presidentialism or semi-presidential-
ism - best facilitates successful democratic transition. The
working hypothesis of the article was that, as between these
three models, parliamentarianism is best at facilitating suc-
132 See Freedom House, Freedom in the World (1999/2000), Poland Country
Report, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey/2000/reports/country/poland.html.
133 See generally Hanna Suchocka, Checks and Balances Under the New Con-
stitution of Poland, ST. Louis-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L. J. 45 (1998). The new
constitution stripped the President of various prerogatives. However, the new con-
stitution, similar to the classic parliamentary models, reserves the roles of "su-
preme representative" and "guarantor of the continuity of the state authority" for
the president. Still, in contrast to traditional parliamentarianism, the new consti-
tution continues to provide for the direct election of the president. See id. The 1997
Polish constitution, as translated from the original Polish by the University of Wu-
erzburg, is available online. POLAND CONST., available at http://www.uni-wu-
erzburg.delaw/plOO000 .html.
134 In this context it is worth noting that as of today, Hungary and the Czech
Republic (both of which adopted parliamentary systems at the start of their respec-
tive transitions) are arguably closer to achieving democratic consolidation than
any other post-communist country. See generally DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, supra
note 2.
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cessful democratic transitions because of its greater capacity to
promote both cooperative and flexible governance. This hypoth-
esis was then examined using three test cases: Spain, Argentina
and Poland.
Having now examined these three test cases, the evidence
seems to suggest that on balance, parliamentarianism may in-
deed possess a greater capacity to promote cooperative and
flexible governance than either presidentialism or semi-pre-
sidentialism. To that extent, it would appear to be the prefera-
ble political model for democratic transition contexts. This is,
however, a tentative conclusion only - further research is
clearly needed.
My hope is that as further research is done on the compara-
tive advantages and disadvantages of parliamentarianism,
presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, it will eventually be-
come possible to provide reliable, empirically-based advice to
transitional governments regarding the core attributes and dy-
namics associated with each of these different constitutional
models. Given the ever-increasing number of transitions to de-
mocracy in the world today, the ability to provide such advice
has never been more important.
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